# The street–garden game analyzed in Section 4 of this chapter has a 16-by-4-by-2 game table when the.

The street–garden game analyzed in Section 4 of this

chapter has a 16-by-4-by-2 game table when the sequential-move version of the

game is expressed in strategic form, as in. There are many Nash equilibria to

be found in this table.

(a) Use best-response analysis to find all of the Nash

equilibria in the in.

(b) Identify the subgame-perfect equilibrium from among

your set of all Nash equilibria. Other equilibrium outcomes look identical to

the subgame-perfect one—they entail the same payoffs for each of the three

players—but they arise after different combinations of strategies. Explain how

this can happen. Describe the credibility problems that arise in the non subgame-perfect

equilibria.